Cleaveland does not support Defendant's argument. The affidavit states that Juror 2 was an office manager for a law firm for 20 years. It does not suggest that she is an office manager. The voir dire proposed by the Defendant and asked of the jury on this issue asked, "Is any member of the panel or any immediate family member an attorney, paralegal, legal secretary, court employee or otherwise connected, by either employment or profession, with the legal or judicial system?
Defendant erroneously seeks to infer that Juror 2 lied to the Court when she simply answered the question posed. Defendant argues once again here that Plaintiff did not make a prima facie case and the jury verdict was erroneous. Plaintiff's case in chief presented the only unbiased witness to this accident, Ms. Herrick, who stated that Plaintiff had a green light when the accident occurred and that Plaintiff was on Quarterfield Road. In addition to Ms. Herrick, Plaintiff testified to these facts as well.
Cruz stated that he was at the light prior to Thelma Avenue when the accident occurred and that Plaintiff had just been in front of him but that he was stuck at a red light and Plaintiff continued down the road. Mitchell testimony.
Defendant erroneously contends that Mr. In fact, Mr. Mitchell plainly stated that as he approached the light, which was green, he was not aware of any particular vehicles and it was not until he saw a van coming towards him that he first was aware of another vehicle. He was not able to state which car was on which road prior to the accident. But even assuming arguendo, that Mr. Mitchell testified as Defendant suggests, a fact Plaintiff specifically denies, Defendant's argument still fails.
Plaintiff could have offered in her case-in-chief five witness that offered differing testimony and still met her burden because the jury could have chosen to believe her at the exclusion of the other witnesses. To support its erroneous interpretation of law, Defendants seek support from Dennard v.
Green , Md. There is, however, an obvious distinction between Dennard and the instant case. In Dennard, the Plaintiff makes equal arguments as the culpability of two defendants. In this case, Plaintiff was clear as to the version of the testimony she wanted the jury to believe - her own. The jury did. Defendant further contends that Ms.
Herrick was the only witness to support the position that Defendant was responsible for the accident. While it is true that Ms. Herrick stated that she was traveling on Quarterfield Road at the time of the accident with a green light, Defendant incorrectly contends she was the only witness. Plaintiff also testified that she was on Quarterfield Road and was struck as she entered the intersection.
The jury chose to believe Plaintiff and Ms. A judgment entered by the court in favor of one party even though the jury returned a verdict for the opposing party. The phrase "judgment notwithstanding the verdict" is abbreviated JNOV, which stands for its Latin equivalent, judgment "non obstante veredicto.
Originally this remedy could be entered only in favor of the plaintiff, and the similar remedy of arrest of judgment could be entered only in favor of the defendant. Under modern law a JNOV is generally available to both plaintiffs and defendants, and an arrest of judgment is primarily used with judgments in criminal cases.
To be granted relief by a JNOV, a party must make a motion seeking that relief. The motion generally must be made in writing and must set forth the specific reasons entitling the party to relief. Many statutes and rules require that the moving party must have previously sought a directed verdict, and that the grounds for the JNOV motion be the same or nearly the same as those for the directed verdict. A directed verdict is a request by a party that the judge enter a verdict in that party's behalf before the case is submitted to the jury.
Although a jury generally must return a verdict before a motion for JNOV can be made, if the jury does not agree on a verdict, as in a jury deadlocked, some courts will hear a motion for JNOV. However, some statutes do not permit a court to hear a motion for JNOV under such circumstances. In deciding a motion for JNOV, the court is facing questions only of law, not fact.
The court must consider only the evidence and any inferences therefrom, and must do so in the light most advantageous to the nonmoving party.
The court must resolve any conflicts in favor of the party resisting the motion. If there is enough evidence to make out a prima facie case against the moving party, or evidence tending to support the verdict, then the court must deny the motion for JNOV. Some courts maintain that if there is a conflict of evidence, such that the jury could decide either way based on factors such as the credibility of witnesses, the court should deny the motion.
Courts approach motions for JNOV with extreme caution and generally will grant them only in clear cases in which the evidence overwhelmingly supports the moving party. In entering a JNOV, the court is simply reversing the jury's verdict; the motion cannot be the basis for increasing or decreasing the verdict. When granting a JNOV, the court needs to independently assess the damages or order a new trial on the issue of damages. The change is one of terminology only and not of substance.
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